Michigan Law Review
Volume 96

Issue 6

1998

Amending the Constitution
Erwen Chemerinsky
University of Southern California Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Erwen Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol96/iss6/10

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
Erwin Chemerinsky*
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC Acrs: .AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITU
TION, 1776-1995. By David E. Kyvig. Kansas: University Press of
Kansas. 1996. Pp. xx, 604. $55.

The ultimate measure of a constitution is how it balances en
trenchment and change. On the one hand, a constitution differs
from all other laws in that it is much more difficult to revise. For
example, the next session of Congress can amend or repeal a stat
ute, but altering the U.S. Constitution requires a complex process
involving supermajorities of both houses of Congress and the states.
A constitution thus reflects a desire to place a society's core values
of governance - such as the structure of government and the rights
of individuals - in a document that is hard to revise. By enacting a
constitution, society limits itself in an effort to protect the values it
most cherishes. For a constitution to achieve this goal it must
endure.
But in order for a constitution to endure, it must contain mecha
nisms for adaptation to changing circumstances. Changes in social
organization, in technology, and in morality all require that the con
stitution evolve. The agrarian slave society of 1787 is so vastly dif
ferent from the world of the coming twenty-first century that it is
unthinkable that the understandings of 200 years ago could solely
govern modem society. Those drafting a constitution cannot possi
bly imagine the myriad of issues that will arise decades and centu
ries later.
A constitution thus must mediate the competing desires for en
trenchment and flexibility, for stability and change. Sometimes
constitutions emphasize the former and make revisions impossible
or very difficult. Long ago, in ancient Greece, Lycurgus, the ruler
of Sparta, insisted that his laws not be changed until he returned
from a long joumey.1 Lycurgus then killed himself to ensure that
the laws not be altered, and they survived for 500 years.2 Some
countries have constitutional provisions that are immune from revi* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Southern Cali
fornia Law School. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard. - Ed. I want to thank
Nancy Morgan for her excellent research assistance.
1. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitu
tional Entrenchment, 29 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 251, 251 (1996).
2. See id.
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sion. The constitutions of Germany and Brazil expressly state that
the division of power between the national and local governments is
not subject to amendment.3 Morocco's constitution states that it
may not be amended to eliminate the monarchy or Islam as the
official religion.4
Nations that have experienced foreign occupation often have
provisions limiting amendment in the case of future foreign inva
sions. For example, the constitution of the French Fourth Republic,
adopted in 1946 in the wake of liberation from Nazi control, prohib
ited amendment of the constitution "in case of occupation of all or
part of the metropolitan territory by foreign force."5
In fact, even the U.S. Constitution specifies certain matters that
may not be changed, even by amendment. Article V, which details
the amendment process, states that "no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Sec
tion of the first Article; and . . . no State, without its Consent, shall
be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. "6 The two clauses
in Article I that could not be changed prohibited Congress from
banning the importing of slaves and prevented a direct tax unless it
was apportioned based on the census.
On the other hand, some constitutions provide very little in the
way of entrenchment or resistance to change. State constitutions
generally are much easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution and
have been amended much more frequently.7 The doctrine of Par
liament's sovereignty in Great Britain means that legislative acts
trump the constitution. As Professor D avid E. Kyvig8 observes:
"As the concept of parliamentary supremacy emerged from notions
that sovereignty belonged to the people rather than to the monarch
and that Parliament legitimately represented the sovereign will, any
thought of limiting Parliament's power to alter the terms of govern
ment faded away" (p. 20).
The key challenge for a constitution is to strike the optimal bal
ance between entrenchment and flexibility. If a constitution makes
3. See Ivo D. DuCHACEK, POWER MAPs: COMPARATIVE PoLmcs OF CoNSTifUTIONS
210 (1973).
4. See id.
5. Id. (quoting FR. CONST. (constitution of the French Fourth Republic, 1946) art. 94).
6. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article I, Section Nine, Clause One, prohibits Congress from
prohibiting the importation of slaves until 1808. Clause four states: "No capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken."
7. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CoNSTifUTIONAL CHOICES 289 n.43 (1985); Developments in
the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1353-56
(1982).
8. Professor of History, University of Akron.
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change too difficult, it will obstruct necessary and desirable social
reforms. Revolution will become the only way of altering the gov
ernment. But if change is too easy, then a constitution fails to
achieve its objective of protecting society's most cherished values
from majoritarian control.
The amendment process is thus not peripheral to the constitu
tion, but is its essence. Professor Kyvig's new book, Explicit and
Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1 776-1995, pro
vides an excellent history of the amendment process, from the rati
fication of the Constitution until 1995. Professor Kyvig shows that
from its inception, the amendment process was integral to the very
existence of the Constitution. For example, at the state ratifying
conventions, supporters of the Constitution could answer objections
by pointing to Article V and the ability to change imperfections
(pp. 81, 85). Unlike the Articles of Confederation, which required
unanimous consent of the states for amendments, the Constitution
offered a more realistic process for change. Thus, state calls for a
bill of rights could be met, not by defeating ratification until a new
constitutional convention was held, but by the amendment process
(pp. 81-85). As Professor Kyvig notes, "At several crucial junctures
in the struggle over ratification, most notably in the Massachusetts,
Virginia, and New York conventions, the promise of amendment
swung the balance in favor of acceptance" (p. 85).
Professor Kyvig's book describes in detail the attempts, success
ful and unsuccessful, to amend the Constitution since 1787. The
book provides a wealth of fascinating facts. For example, I had not
known that James Madison, the crucial figure in drafting the Bill of
Rights, almost was not elected to the first Congress. Patrick Henry,
Madison's foe, successfully kept the Virginia legislature from choos
ing Madison for the United States Senate and Madison's home
county was gerrymandered into a largely anti-Federalist district (p.
95). Madison defeated his opponent, James Monroe, for the House
seat only after promising his commitment to adding a bill of rights
to the Constitution.
Even more important, I did not know that in 1861, on the eve of
the Civil War, both houses of Congress ratified an amendment to
protect the institution of slavery. The amendment, introduced by
Thomas Corwin and supported by President Lincoln, provided:
"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will au
thorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within
any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of
persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State" (p. 151).
The House of Representatives passed the amendment by a vote of
133 to 65, and the Senate did so by a vote of 24 to 12 (p. 151). The
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amendment was meant to prevent the Civil War, and it is frighten
ing to fathom the course of American history if it had succeeded.
Kyvig's careful history of the amendment process shows how
well Article V strikes a balance between entrenchment and flexibil
ity. Over the course of American history, more than 10,000 amend
ments have been proposed through the mechanisms provided in
Article V of the Constitution. Only thirty-three received approval
by both the House and the Senate, and just twenty-seven have been
ratified by the states. Yet, most of the ratified amendments, by any
measure, were desirable revisions to the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights was crucial to the ratification of the document and has been
key in protecting basic liberties. The post-Civil War Amendments
were essential in ending slavery and ensuring the federalization of
fundamental rights. Many of the amendments were crucial in
perfecting democracy by extending the franchise to blacks, to
women, to the poor, and to eighteen-year-olds.
Professor Kyvig's history of the amendment process, and consid
eration of the tension between constraint and change, raise two
questions. First, what are the assumptions and implications of hav
ing a brief constitution that is relatively difficult to change? Profes
sor Kyvig's book provides a powerful reminder that this is the core
nature of the U.S. Constitution. Professor Kyvig's book reveals
how much such a constitution is based on trust in the government it
creates and how much it relies on a judiciary with the authority to
interpret and adapt the constitution to a world so vastly different
from what the Framers could have imagined.
Second, when should the Constitution be amended? In the past
few years, countless proposals have been introduced in Congress to
amend the Constitution to achieve goals ranging from balancing the
budget, to allowing school prayer, to prohibiting abortion, to out
lawing flag burning. In light of Professor Kyvig's history, is it possi
ble to develop a theory of when amendments are worthy?
Professor Kyvig's enterprise is historical, recounting the successful
and unsuccessful attempts at amendment. Professor Kyvig offers no
conclusions as to when the amendment process is appropriate and
when it should remain unused. Yet his history offers an excellent
vehicle for considering the proper use of the amendment process to
preserve the delicate balance between entrenchment and flexibility.
This review essay uses Professor Kyvig's careful, well-written
history as the starting point for examining these two questions.
Although Professor Kyvig's book is not the first recent attempt to
examine the amendment process,9 it is the most systematic history
to date. This excellent book should be of great interest to anyone
9. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA (1993);
JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN TIIE UNITED STATES (1994); REsPONDING TO
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interested in the amendment process or, indeed, in the Constitution
of the United States.
I.

WHAT ARE THE ASSUMPTIONS OF A RELATIVELY SHORT
CONSTITUTION THAT Is DIFFICULT TO AMEND?

In April 1997, I was elected by Los Angeles voters to a fifteen
person commission to rewrite the Los Angeles City Charter. The
Charter has many of the characteristics of a constitution.10 It cre
ates the structure of government and allocates power among its
branches. It prescribes much of how the government operates. It
can protect rights, so long as its safeguards are greater than those
contained in federal or state law. The current Los Angeles Charter
was adopted by the voters in 1925. It has been amended over 400
times by voter initiative, and it is several hundred pages long.
The Charter's contrast to the U.S. Constitution could not be
more striking. The Constitution is a blueprint for a government. In
the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, " [a] constitution, to con
tain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great pow
ers will adinit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind."11 Marshall then
uttered some of the most famous words in all of the United States
Reports: "In considering this question, then, we must never forget,
that it is a constitution we are expounding."12 In contrast, the Los
Angeles City Charter is much more an operations manual than a
blueprint.
The amendment processes of the two documents are quite dif
ferent. The Constitution is difficult to alter and has been amended
just twenty-seven times in 220 years. The Charter is easy to revise;
it takes just a majority vote in an election to approve a Charter
amendment. The differences between the U.S. Constitution and
the L.A. Charter cannot be explained by the level of government or
the varying functions of the two documents. A constitution could
be just as long and just as detailed as the Los Angeles Charter, and
a charter could be just as brief as the U.S. Constitution.
Simultaneously reading Kyvig's book and struggling with the
Charter revision process in Los Angeles bring to mind the question:
What are the assumptions of creating or being governed by a short
document that is relatively difficult to change? Kyvig's book helps
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AMENDMENT (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995).
10. Charter of the City of Los Angeles Annotated (Revision 7, 1990 Edition Revised,
1997).
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
12. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
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show that the style of the United States Constitution rests on two
premises.
First, a short constitution that is relatively immune from change
assumes great trust in those who will be governing under it. Fre
quently it is said that the Framers of the Constitution acted on a
distrust of those who would be governing them in the future. Cer
tainly, the Constitution's division of powers, via separation of pow
ers and federalism, is based on such distrust. The strong call for a
Bill of Rights, which Kyvig describes in detail (pp. 66-109), reflected
a widely perceived need to further limit those who would be
governing.
Yet it is striking how much detail the Framers left out of the
Constitution, with the trust that government officials would be true
to the spirit of the document. Perhaps most notably, the power of
judicial review is not specified, but the Framers likely assumed it as
implicit in a Constitution of limited powers with an Article III judi
ciary.13 This is but one of countless examples of major matters that
the Constitution leaves to those who would govern under it. For
example, the Constitution does not mandate the funding of any of
fice or agency. Nothing in the Constitution expressly requires that
Congress provide money for the operation of the executive or the
judiciary.14
The Constitution does not mention many basic powers of gov
ernment. Although the Constitution specifies who has the appoint
ment power, it is silent about removal authority. 15 This is not a
trivial power; it is crucial to a President's ability to control the exec
utive branch, · and the issue of removal was the core of the only suc
cessful effort to impeach a President. The Constitution says nothing
about countless other issues that undoubtedly could have been
foreseen in 1787. For example, no provision explicitly addresses
who has the power to recognize foreign governments.
The lack of detail is also reflected in the broad phrasing of so
many of the Constitution's provisions. Article II, for example, pro
vides for impeachment for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."16 The Framers offered no criteria as to what
constitute "high crimes and misdemeanors," and the Constitution
outlines only the most basic procedures for the impeachment
process.
13. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. {1 Cranch) 137 {1803); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
490 {Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
14. There is, of course, the prohibition against decreasing judicial salaries for Article III
judges. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
15. See Morrison v . Olson, 487 U.S. 654 {1988) {discussing the removal power of the
President and Congress's ability to limit it); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935) (same); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 {1926) (same).
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
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For all of these examples, and countless more, the Constitution
could have been very specific. As I suggested above, what has been
overlooked, and this is evident in reading Professor Kyvig's book, is
the degree to which the Constitution was based on trust in those
who would be governing to work out these matters and the knowl
edge that there was an amendment process to solve the problems
that might develop. The conventional wisdom about the Constitu
tion emphasizes the Framers' distrust in government, as reflected in
their desire for separation of powers, federalism, and ultimately a
bill of rights. This account is undoubtedly accurate, but equally im
portant is the extent to which the Constitution reflects a profound
trust in those who would be governing under it.
Moreover, when the Constitution is viewed in this light, it is
striking that at a time of relatively great public distrust and cynicism
about government, trust remains in the basic framework set out by
the Constitution. Kyvig's book does not discuss a single proposal to
replace the Constitution with a modem document. Indeed, Kyvig
shows that proposals for a constitutional convention for limited
purposes, such as for a balanced budget amendment, are fiercely
opposed based on the fear that the convention might seek to pro
pose a broader overhaul in the document (pp. 440-42). The
profound public trust in the Constitution is one of its most impor
tant features, and the one most often taken for granted. Professor
Kyvig's analysis shows how much Article V's mechanisms for
amendment have been crucial to this public confidence since the
Constitution's inception.
Reading Kyvig's book made clear the challenge for us in writing
a new Los Angeles Charter or for anyone attempting to draft a new
state constitution or city charter. A short document is possible if
there is confidence in those who will hold office and confidence in
the process the document allows for its change. At a time of a loss
of public confidence in government at all levels, is it possible to
write a blueprint rather than a legal code? Every detail in a docu
ment like the Los Angeles Charter is there because a constituency
wanted the protection of details. How can such groups be satisfied
that their interests will be adequately safeguarded without very spe
cific delineations?
A second assumption demonstrated by Kyvig's book involves
the nature of the amendment process. An understanding of the
Constitution as a short document that is relatively immune from
change provides powerful support for the view that the Constitu
tion's meaning should evolve by judicial interpretation as well as by
amendment. The debate over the method of constitutional inter
pretation is a familiar one. Over the last two decades, it frequently
has been characterized as one between originalism, sometimes
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called interpretivism, and nonoriginalism, sometimes termed
noninterpretivism. Originalism is the view that "judges deciding
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms
that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution."17 In
contrast, nonoriginalism is the "contrary view that courts should go
beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be dis
covered within the four comers of the document."1 8
Originalists believe that the Constitution should evolve solely by
amendment.19 If there is to be a right to use contraceptives or a
right to abortion, originalists would say that the Constitution must
be amended. In contrast, nonoriginalists believe that since the Con
stitution's meaning is not limited to what the framers intended, the
meaning and application of constitutional provisions can evolve by
interpretation as well as by amendment.20 The fact that the Fram
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit gender
discrimination or to apply the Bill of Rights to the states is not deci
sive for the nonoriginalist in deciding what the Constitution means.
The Supreme Court, at various times, has professed adherence
to both of these competing philosophies. In South Carolina v.
United States, in 1905, the Court stated: "The Constitution is a writ
ten instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it
meant when adopted it means now."21 But equally strong state
ments from the Court reject an originalist approach. In Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, in 1934, the Court declared:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a
century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time.
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have
placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to
guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall
uttered the memorable warning - "We must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding. "22

17. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, G. Edward White's Apology for Judicial Activism, 63 TEXAS
L. REv. 367, 372 (1984); William Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful
Contributions ofSpecial Theories ofJudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 234 n.66 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause should be interpreted according to contem
porary norms); see also PETER IRONS, BRENNAN vs. REHNQUIST. THE BATILE FOR THE
CONSTITUTION (1994); Bernard Schwartz, Brennan vs. Rehnquist - Mirror Images in Consti
tutional Construction, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 213 (1994).
21. 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).

May 1998]

Amending the Constitution

1569

Professor Kyvig's book is directly relevant to this debate be
cause the ease of amendment is crucial in appraising whether
change can occur only through that process. Professor Kyvig's
book demonstrates that perceptions about the relative ease and dif
ficulty of amendments have varied over time (pp. 188-89, 216-18,
240-41). Overall, though, Professor Kyvig's book shows a consis
tent recognition that amendment was a difficult process and likely
to occur only relatively infrequently.
Therefore, to say, as originalists do, that the Constitution may
be modified only by amendment is to say that there will be virtually
no evolution in the meaning of the document. As noted above,
though, constitutional evolution is essential for the document to
deal with modem problems and to adapt to changes, such as in
technology and social values. Unless the Constitution evolves, over
time ever greater areas of governance will be left solely to the
majoritarian processes. The Constitution's promise of constraint
and entrenched protections will increasingly be lost. For example,
it is highly unlikely that the Constitution could have been amended
successfully to eliminate school segregation or require reapportion
ment of legislatures. These examples show why it would be wrong
for the Constitution to evolve solely by amendment: the rights of
minorities, political or racial, should not be made to depend solely
on a supermajority's willingness to act.
Moreover, evolution solely by amendment is inferior because it
is unlikely that society would be willing to devote the energy and
resources to amend the Constitution constantly. If all evolution
were by amendment, frequent amendments would need to be ad
ded to the Constitution. But Professor Kyvig's history shows that
the cumbersome nature of the amendment process, and the need
for approval from so many different institutions, makes it highly
unlikely that a sufficient number of amendments would be ratified.
Even more important, frequent amendment could create
problems of its own. If amendments were routine and not excep
tional, there is reason to fear that precisely when it matters most,
constitutional protections might be eliminated by amendment. The
Framers feared that in times of crisis there would be strong pres
sures to centralize power and to compromise rights. Making
amendment difficult protects against those temptations. The obsta
cles to successful amendments that Professor Kyvig describes are
thus integral to the Constitution's central function of entrenchment.
Also, if amendments were frequent, the Constitution would lose
its symbolic value as a brief, abstract document. The comparison to
state constitutions and city charters is again illustrative. Joseph
Long observed over 80 years ago:
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The federal constitution . . . has happily escaped the fate that has
befallen the constitutions of the states. Not only are they subject to
constant change, but they have long since ceased to be constitutions in
a true sense. Instead of embodying broad general propositions of fun
damental permanent law, they now exhibit the prolixity of a code and
consist largely of mere legislation. No one now entertains any partic
ular respect for a state constitution. It has little more dignity than an
ordinary act of the legislature.23

More recently, Laurence Tribe similarly remarked how the "clut
tered" nature of state constitutions explains why they "rarely com
mand the respect routinely p aid to federal constitutional
guarantees. "24
Thus, crucial to the very nature of the Constitution is an amend
ment process, that as Professor Kyvig shows, is likely to be used
successfully only relatively infrequently. The result is that essential
constitutional evolution must occur by judicial interpretation and
not just through the rare and occasional amendment.
II.

WHEN AMEND

THE

CONSTITUTION?

Reading Professor Kyvig's history of the amendment process
causes one to feel relief that the Framers made constitutional revi
sions relatively difficult. He describes many efforts to amend the
Constitution that thankfully failed. For example, James Madison's
first proposed amendment to the Constitution would have limited
each member of the House of Representatives to representing a
district of no more than 50,000 residents. If ratified, the amend
ment, over time, would have led to a House that was truly unwork
able. Kyvig notes: "If constituencies were limited to 50,000
citizens, the nature of republican government in a nation of 250 mil
lion people would change dramatically. A representative would
bear a very different relationship to 50,000 constituents than to the
present average of nearly 600,000 and to 4,999 colleagues than to
the current 434" (p. 470).
Most striking, as mentioned above, it defies comprehension to
imagine the course of U.S. history if the amendment proposed by
Congress in 1861 to institutionalize slavery had been adopted (p.
151). More recently, serious efforts to amend the Constitution to
overturn the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions failed
(pp. 371-79), and the assurance of one-person, one-vote is now al
most universally accepted as an essential protection of the demo
cratic process.2s
23. Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 580 (1915).
24. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 289 n.43.
25. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 17, at 101-02. But see ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 87 (1990) (criticizing the decisions on the grounds that the "Warren majority's new
constitutional doctrine was supported by nothing").
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But Kyvig's history also shows that it is wrong to assume that
the rejection of proposed constitutional amendments always, in
hindsight, should be regarded as a good thing. Kyvig recites in de
tail the fight over the Equal Rights Amendment (pp. 395-419). The
National Women's party began drafting an equal rights amendment
in September 1921 and unanimously endorsed it in 1923 (p. 396).
"[The] first equal rights amendment, drafted by [Alice] Paul and
introduced in Congress in December 1923 by Republican Senator
Charles Curtis, simply declared, 'Men and women shall have equal
rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its
jurisdiction' " (p. 396). Even after reading Kyvig's description of
the history, it is astounding and disheartening that the country
could not approve a basic statement that "[e]quality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex. "26
Other beneficial constitutional amendments also never were
adopted. After the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law
prohibiting child labor in Hammer v. Dagenhart,27 a serious effort
was made to amend the Constitution to outlaw such practices (pp.
255-61, 307-13). The proposed amendment to forbid child labor
never was ratified. The Supreme Court changed course in 1937,
later expressly overruling Hammer, and thus the amendment be
came unnecessary.28 Yet I think it is wrong to say that the ultimate
prohibition of child labor shows that the child labor amendment
was unnecessary. For over twenty years, from 1918 when the Court
struck down the federal child labor law until the Court permitted
the regulation, countless children were hurt who might have been
protected by a constitutional amendment.
Another example of a desirable amendment proposed by Con
gress and not ratified by the states would have granted residents of
the District of Columbia representation in Congress (pp. 394-95,
420-25). Under any theory of representative government it is im
possible to justify the fact that those who live in the District of Co
lumbia are not represented by voting members in the House of
26. Proposed Equal Rights Amendment. There can, of course, be disagreement over
how much it would have mattered to add the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution.
First, I believe that it would have been an important symbolic declaration of gender equality.
Second, the amendment likely would have meant strict scrutiny for gender classifications,
rather than the intermediate scrutiny that the Court has used since 1976. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 {1976); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 {1996) (reaf
firming the use of intermediate scrutiny but stating that there must be an "exceedingly per
suasive justification" for gender classifications). Some cases likely would have been decided
differently if the Equal Rights Amendment had been in place, such as Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 {1981), which allowed sex-based discrimination in statutory rape laws,
and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 {1981), which upheld male-only draft registration.
27. 247 U.S. 251 {1918).
28. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (overruling Hammer).
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Representatives or the Senate. Although Congress passed an
amendment to correct the problem, only sixteen states had ap
proved it before the time period for its ratification expired (p. 423).
The rejection was not based on a defensible principle, but rather
based on the perception that the District of Columbia's African
American-majority population likely would elect Democrats to the
House and the Senate.

It should not be assumed, however, that all amendments that
made it through the gauntlet and were adopted were desirable
changes. Kyvig provides a detailed description of how the Eight
eenth Amendment, mandating prohibition of alcohol, was enacted
(pp. 218-26), how quickly it came to be regarded as a colossal mis
take, and how the Twenty-first Amendment repealed it just thirteen
years later (pp. 261-67).
For me, the key question in reading Professor Kyvig's book is
whether any lessons can be drawn from history as to when the Con
stitution should be amended. In the 1990s, as Republicans gained
control over both the House and the Senate, countless proposals
have been introduced to amend the Constitution for matters rang
ing from ensuring a balanced budget, to prohibiting flag burning, to
allowing school prayer, to reforming campaign finance, to ensuring
religious equality, to changing the procedures for imposing new
taxes, to safeguarding victims' rights. Is it possible from a study of
history, such as Kyvig's, to derive criteria as to when the Constitu
tion should be amended and when left unchanged? Professor Kyvig
offers no such analysis - though, in fairness, that was not his goal
in the book. He sought to provide a history of the amendment pro
cess and not a normative analysis of when it should be used.
Recently, others have attempted to articulate criteria for when
constitutional amendment is appropriate. In August 1997, a group
called Citizens for the Constitution released a draft titled, 'Great

and Extraordinary Occasions': Developing Standards for Constitu
tional Change.29 A distinguished group that included law profes

sors Michael Seidman, Kathleen Sullivan, and Don Wallace and
attorneys Alan Morrison, Robert Peck, and Peter Wallison pre
pared the report. The draft report urges the need for restraint in
amending the Constitution and presents criteria for when amend
ment is appropriate.
Specifically, the draft report states the following principles for
constitutional amendment:
1. Constitutional amendments should address matters of more than
immediate concern that are likely to be recognized as of abiding im
portance by subsequent generations.

29. Citizens for the Constitution, 'Great and Extraordinary Occasions': Developing Stan
dards for Constitutional Change (Aug. 1997) (unpublished draft report on file with author).
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2. Constitutional amendments should not make our system less po
litically responsive except to the extent necessary to protect individual
rights.
3. Constitutional amendments should be utilized only when there
are significant practical or legal obstacles to the achievement of the
same objectives by other means.
4. Constitutional amendments should not be adopted when they
would damage the cohesiveness of constitutional doctrine as a whole.
5. Constitutional amendments should embody enforceable, and not
purely aspirational, standards.
6. Proponents of constitutional amendments should attempt to think
through and articulate the consequences of their proposals, including
the ways in which the amendments would interact with other constitu
tional provisions and principles.
7. Constitutional amendments should be enacted using procedures
designed to ensure full and fair debate.
8. Constitutional amendments should have a non-extendable dead
line for ratification by the states so as to ensure that there is a contem
poraneous consensus by Congress and the states that the amendment
is desirable.30

It is difficult to disagree with any of these principles. Some
seem unassailable. For example, who could possibly object to the
sixth principle, which urges reflection as to the effect of proposed
amendments on other aspects of the Constitution, or the seventh
principle, which calls for full and fair debate in amending the Con
stitution? The first through fifth proposals likewise seem desirable
and almost axiomatic.
In addition, the very recent experience with the ratification of
the Twenty-seventh Amendment shows the wisdom of the eighth
proposal. Kyvig describes the story of the Twenty-seventh Amend
ment (pp. 462-70), which prohibits pay raises to members of Con
gress during their terms of office, and liow it was ratified by the
states and added to the Constitution nearly 200 years after it was
proposed by Congress. An amendment should be deemed ratified
when a supermajority of states, as prescribed in Article V, approves
it. The problem when ratification occurs over decades or centuries
is that there may never have been a time when a super-majority
approved it, but rather different groups at varying times.
In fact, Kyvig points out that there are several other amend
ments, passed by Congress and still pending before the states with
out a time limit for ratification, such as "Madison's first amendment
limiting the size of congressional districts to 50,000 residents, the
1810 amendment banning citizens from accepting foreign titles, the
1861 amendment guaranteeing the continuation of slavery in states
30. Id.
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where it then existed, and the 1924 child labor amendment" (p.
469).
Yet, appraising these principles after reading Kyvig's history
raises questions as to whether the Citizens for the Constitution's
criteria are useful in distinguishing good from bad amendments.
For example, I certainly agree with the first proposition that "Con
stitutional amendments should address matters of more than imme
diate concern that are likely to be recognized as of abiding
importance by subsequent generations."31 Yet I imagine that the
supporters of any amendment would defend their proposal as deal
ing with matters of "abiding importance." Kyvig shows that sup
porters of Prohibition, surely regarded as the largest mistake in the
use of the amendment process, defended it as dealing with a signifi
cant and long-term problem (pp. 218-26). Kyvig observes that "[i]n
1919 national prohibition appeared to be a widely supported inno
vation in public policy and constitutionalism" (p. 225).
The Citizens for the Constitution draft report uses the proposed
flag desecration amendment as an illustration of a reform that does
not meet the first proposition. Although I share their opposition to
the amendment, I am skeptical as to whether supporters of the pro
posal would accept that conclusion. Those favoring a flag desecra
tion amendment likely would argue that the flag is a unique and
abiding symbol that should be protected now and forever.
More generally, I question whether it is possible at any moment
in time to know which issues will be of concern only briefly and
which will have lasting significance. No one could have known in
1920 whether the Supreme Court's preclusion of federal laws
prohibiting child labor would have lasted for years or decades.
Also, significant social problems might exist that require immediate
attention by amendment, even if they tum out to be relatively
short-term in duration. Again, the failed child labor amendment is
illustrative. Even if it only would have had legal significance for
twenty years, during that time it might have protected the health
and lives of innumerable children. The Twenty-fourth Amendment,
which prohibited poll taxes, likely was not dealing with a problem
of enduring significance; few states still had them when the Amend
ment passed, and in those few they likely were on the way out. The
Amendment, though, mattered in that it extended the franchise and
symbolically reaffirmed the right of every person, regardless of
wealth, to participate in the democratic process.
Perhaps more significant from a constitutional perspective is the
question of ,the proper use of the amendment process as a check on
the Supreme Court. Kyvig's book details four instances in which
31. Id.
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the Constitution was amended to overturn Supreme Court deci
sions. The Eleventh Amendment, which protects state govern
ments from being sued in federal court, was ratified to overturn the
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia32 (pp. 111-14). The Four
teenth Amendment's declaration that "[a]ll persons born or natu
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re
side"33 overrules the Court's contrary ruling in Dred Scott v. Sand
ford34 (p. 156-163). The Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes
the personal income tax, was adopted to overrule the Court's deci
sion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.35 (pp. 193-218). Fi
nally, the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which protected the right of
those over eighteen to vote, was enacted in response to Oregon v.
Mitchelf36 that invalidated a federal law that created the same re
quirement (pp. 363-68).
If it is accepted, as I argued in Part I, that the Supreme Court
should have discretion in interpreting the Constitution to ensure
necessary evolution, then the amendment process becomes crucial
as the only direct political check on the judiciary. When is it appro
priate to use the amendment process to overturn a Supreme Court
decision that is regarded as seriously misguided? Although I disa
gree with virtually all of the contemporary proposals to overturn
Supreme Court decisions by constitutional amendments, I cannot
yet articulate a reason why this is an illegitimate use of the amend
ing process. To the contrary, Kyvig's history shows that since its
inception the amendment process has been used in just this way.
The first amendment adopted after the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh
Amendment, was enacted to overturn a Supreme Court decision,
and there have been countless proposals to try by amendment to
overrule other decisions.
Again, I do not disagree with the effort to articulate criteria for
when the Constitution should be amended. Professor Kyvig's book
puts that issue directly before the reader. Nor do I disagree with
the initial efforts by Citizens for the Constitution. I think, however,
that Professor Kyvig's excellent history shows that developing use
ful criteria will be a very difficult task. Good proposals for amend
ments have been defeated and bad ones adopted; bad ones have
been defeated and many good ones adopted. Supporters of all
thought that they were making essential reforms; opponents of all
claimed that they were protecting the majesty of the Constitution.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
157 U.S. 429 (1895).
400 U.S. 112 (1971).
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Reading the descriptions of the contemporaneous debates over the
proposals shows how difficult it is at any moment in time to assess
how an amendment later will be regarded. Remember, even Presi
dent Lincoln supported an amendment to deny Congress "the
power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or ser
vice by the laws of said State" (p. 151).
CONCLUSION

Professor David Kyvig's book begins by quoting President
George Washington's farewell address, that the Constitution "till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is
sacredly obligatory upon all" (p. 1). Washington further said: "If in
the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected
by an amendment in the way the Constitution designates" (p. 1).
Professor Kyvig's book provides an excellent history of the use
of this amending process and a powerful argument that the mecha
nisms created by Article V of the Constitution are at the very core
of the Constitution's existence and survival. More than the Framers
ever could have imagined, they created a process that provided an
almost ideal balance between stability and change, between en
trenchment and flexibility.
As the Elected Los Angeles Charter Reform Commission strug
gles with the task of proposing a new "constitution" for Los Ange
les, Professor Kyvig's book provides crucial insights. The issues for
the Charter are remarkably the same as those confronted in draft
ing a constitution. What branches of government should be created
and how should power be allocated among them? Should power be
decentralized, such as by empowering boroughs or neighborhood
councils with tasks that previously had been done in a centralized
fashion? Should there be an enforceable bill of rights and if so,
what rights should be protected?
The central tensions identified in Professor Kyvig's book also
are identical in writing a constitution or a charter. If successful in
the Charter reform process, we are writing a document to last for
decades and to deal with problems that we cannot begin to imagine.
The document must constrain and check, but it must be adaptable
too. The document must be general enough to be comprehensible
and unifying, but specific enough to create a workable government.
Professor Kyvig's book forces attention on how the document
should be subject to change. What mechanism for revision will best
strike the balance between constraint and flexibility, allowing
needed reforms, but avoiding too frequent modifications?

